Quantum computing in telecommunications

A telecom network carries other people’s secrets for a living. That makes quantum computing in telecommunications mostly a security question: the traffic crossing your backhaul today, and the keys inside millions of SIM cards, were protected with algorithms that a large quantum computer would break. The optimization side is real but young. Most operators should spend this year on cryptography and treat everything else as research.

How soon does quantum computing change a telecom network?

Quantum computing is already changing telecom networks through cryptography, years before any machine can break RSA. NIST’s post-quantum standards came out in 2024, browsers already use them by default, and traffic recorded today can be decrypted later. Network optimization with quantum computers is still experimental and has no date worth budgeting around.

NIST published its first post-quantum standards (FIPS 203, 204 and 205) on August 13, 2024, and its draft transition plan, NIST IR 8547 from November 2024, deprecates RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography in 2030 and disallows them in 2035. Chrome switched its default key exchange to the hybrid ML-KEM scheme in late 2024, as BleepingComputer reported, so part of your customers’ web traffic is already post-quantum whether or not your network did anything.

The computing side is later. No quantum computer today solves a network planning problem better than a good classical solver. That may change once error-corrected machines arrive, and Google’s Willow chip (December 2024) showed error rates falling as the device grew, but nobody can give you a date you should budget around.

Harvest now, decrypt later is the reason the first timeline matters to operators more than to most companies. Traffic recorded from a submarine cable landing or a microwave link today can be stored and read in ten years. You carry government, bank and health traffic, so your customers’ confidentiality windows become yours.

Where does QKD still make sense for an operator?

QKD still makes sense for an operator only on a handful of fixed, high-value links, such as data center interconnects, where a customer asks for it and will pay for dedicated fiber and trusted nodes. Everywhere else, post-quantum cryptography is the practical choice, and security agencies such as the UK NCSC say so directly.

Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is the default for almost every link. It runs as software on existing routers, gateways, HSMs and SIMs, and it scales to millions of endpoints. Quantum key distribution (QKD) sends keys encoded in photons over dedicated fiber or satellite links, works over limited distances, and needs trusted relay nodes in between.

The security agencies have been direct about this. In an August 2025 white paper the UK NCSC wrote that it “will not support the use of QKD for government or military applications” and that “PQC is the best mitigation.” That doesn’t make QKD useless. Some operators have tested setups that combine PQC with QKD on their most sensitive links as a second layer.

A reasonable position for most operators: migrate everything to PQC (with hybrid schemes during the transition), and evaluate QKD only for a handful of fixed, high-value links where a customer is asking for it and willing to pay for it.

Where does cryptography sit in a telecom network?

Cryptography in a telecom network sits in SIM and eSIM profiles, backhaul and core interfaces, roaming interconnects, the operator’s PKI, firmware signing on network equipment and the systems that hold long-lived records. Much of it lives in vendor equipment and in devices the operator doesn’t control, which makes the inventory harder than in a bank.

The GSMA’s Post-Quantum Telco Network Taskforce, a group of operators and vendors, organizes its guidance by use case for this reason. The main places to look:

Standards set part of the pace, and 3GPP is still studying how mobile standards should make the transition. Some pieces you can move now; others will wait for your vendors’ roadmaps. Knowing which is which is most of the planning work.

Are there optimization use cases in telecom?

Telecom has optimization use cases for quantum computing on paper, such as antenna placement, frequency assignment and capacity planning, and a few operators have run exploratory pilots. None has shown a result that beats the classical solvers operators already use, so any test should be small and measured against a clear classical baseline.

Antenna placement is the typical example, because the number of possible configurations is huge. Pilots on it have been framed as exploration, with no production results announced.

Other candidates include frequency assignment, network capacity planning and routing under failure scenarios. They all have the combinatorial shape that quantum optimization targets. They also all have strong classical solvers already in use. If you want to test one, do it with a clear classical baseline and a small budget, through a quantum use case discovery rather than a vendor demo.

What an operator should do this year

1. Name an owner for the post-quantum migration, with a budget line, inside security or network architecture.
2. Build a cryptographic inventory that covers network elements, IT systems and vendor products, ranked by how long the protected data must stay secret.
3. Ask every major network vendor for a written post-quantum roadmap, with dates, for the equipment you run today.
4. Put crypto-agility and PQC support into the requirements of every new RFP, including SIM and eSIM suppliers.
5. Pilot hybrid key exchange on one internal link (a data center interconnect or a management network) to learn the operational cost.
6. Decide your QKD position in writing, so sales and security give customers the same answer.

How AndesQubit fits

Most operators start with a quantum readiness assessment to size the problem, then move to a post-quantum cryptography migration plan. Groups with operations in several countries often need a quantum strategy and roadmap that lines up the migration with each regulator’s timing. We work in English and Spanish, and we are opening engagements in stages; write to us to join the early-access list.